Bohlen`s friend at the State Department, George Kennan, was not so optimistic. In a memorandum written just before Yalta, Kennan made a bleak and forward-looking assessment of future Soviet relations with the West. He saw no hope of cooperation with Stalin in a post-war Europe, but an “inevitable conflict between the allied need for stable and independent nations in Europe and a Soviet advance to the West.” In a very short time, Stalin refused to do his bargain against Poland, not respecting the declaration on liberated Europe. And only a year and a month after Yalta, on March 5, 1946, Churchill delivered his famous “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri. On May 4, 1944, Churchill asked his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, the rhetorical question: “Will we agree with the communitarianization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?”  Churchill answered his own question by saying that Britain must “resist communist infusion and invasion.”  The attempt to gain spheres of influence for the Balkans has led Gusev to question whether the Americans would be involved.  Eden assured Gusev that the Americans would support the spheres of influence of the agreement, but on request, the State Department responded firmly that it was not the policy of the United States to conclude such agreements as would violate the Atlantic Charter.  Churchill found himself in a difficult situation and spoke directly to Roosevelt. The British historian David Carlton recounts that after the discussion on Italy, Bulgaria turned again, with Stalin claiming that the Bulgarian Communists were deterred by the Red Army from their radicalism.  Stalin argued that the Soviets had no intention of using Bulgaria as a base to threaten Turkey and opposed any British role in Bulgaria, leading Eden to reply that Britain was entitled to a “small share” after three years of war with Bulgaria.  Bulgaria proved to be the main harshness in the meeting between Eden and Molotov on 10 October, during which Eden accused the Bulgarians of mistreating British officers in Greek Thrace, and wanted the Soviet Union to ask them to treat British officers with respect, which, in a rare joking moment, prompted Molotov to say that the Soviets were coming to promise it. not to interfere in Greece`s internal affairs.  The main point soon was the ceasefire with Bulgaria.
 The weapons that the Soviet Union had just signed with Romania and Finland gave power to an Allied Control Commission (ACC) to operate “under the general direction and orders” of the Soviet High Command, which gave the Soviets the main voice in those nations.  The US draft ceasefire with Bulgaria stipulated that the ACC should be responsible for Bulgaria`s “Big Three” governments and had agreed to accept.  Molotov wanted Eden to abandon British support for the American project and accept the Soviet project, almost identical to the Finnish and Romanian arms warnings.  Eden refused to withdraw, which barked at Molotov, that Bulgaria borders the Black Sea, and if the Soviets were willing to accept that Britain had special interests in the Mediterranean, then the Soviet Union had special interests in the Black Sea, prompting him to say: “Bulgaria was not Italy, Spain, Greece or even Yugoslavia.”  At one point, Molotov suggested that the Soviet Union was ready to accept the partition of Yugoslavia, with Britain having included the Adriatic coast and the Soviet Union inside if only the British returned to Bulgaria.  On 11 October, Molotov offered Eden 20% influence in Bulgaria and a modified ceasefire stipulating that the ACC would act in Bulgaria on the orders of the Soviet High Command, but with the “participation” of the British and American governments.  Eden approved the Molotov project and also agreed that the ceasefire with Hungary would be identical to the Bulgarian ceasefire when it was signed.  Churchill called it a naughty document.  After the discussion on the Balkans, Churchill and Stalin turned