On Monday 15 October 2012, in a solemn ceremony, the Prime Minister of the British Government and the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament publicly signed a document entitled “Agreement between the Uk Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on Scottish independence, known as the “Edinburgh Agreement” (at least in Scotland) (to examine its content, see Aileen McHarg`s previous contribution). At the signing ceremony, the emphasis was placed on the agreement between the Scottish and British authorities, which is not based on the meeting of the leaders of David Cameron and Alex Salmond, but on the existence of a text legally defining their respective obligations (the Scottish Government website describes its signing as a “ratification” of the agreement). But did this text have a legal status and, if not, does it play a role? The details of the agreement between governments are set out in the memorandum and draft regulation that are part of this agreement. The word “ratification” and the ceremony related to the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement indicated a process similar to that of a treaty. It was an agreement between two heads of government and their senior ministers. This is obviously not a legal treaty, since under the Treaty of Viennese, a treaty is “an international agreement concluded by states”. International law adds that the parties must intend to create legal obligations at the international level. In the case of the Edinburgh Agreement, only one party was a sovereign state. As far as reputation is concerned, the party that violates this agreement will in future be considered unreliable and less likely to sign credible agreements with it.
These costs are real for the UK government, which sees itself as a credible international deal-maker, but also for other de decentralised regions where deployment could be even higher (Northern Ireland). But they are also real for the Scottish Government, which is trying to present itself as a sovereign government, which is waiting for those who are trying to convince it to vote for independence, but also for states and external organisations (see EU debates). Reputation costs are increased by having an agreement with clear obligations that leave as little room for ambiguity as possible, and also by making them public with great fanfare. The public signing of the agreement by two governments increases the cost of reputational violations, but also extends these costs to future governments in the UK or Scotland if one of these governments changes before all commitments are implemented and attempts to change attitudes (which can never be completely ruled out). This dynamic of reciprocity and prestige may also explain why a British government, which had something to lose from the symbolism of the “treaty” of the common signature of the government, was happy to approve it.